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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
This case is on interlocutory appeal from an Order of 
the Third Judicial District Court of Tooele County, State of 
Utah, entered by the Honorable Frank G. Noel, District Court 
Judge, denying plaintiff's Motion to Compel Production of 
Document. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The issue on appeal is whether the district court 
inappropriately extended a privilege, whether based on the 
attorney-client privilege or work-product immunity, to prevent 
discovery of an agreement that is admitted to be part and 
parcel of a commercial transaction that is at issue in the 
lawsuit. 
PERTINENT STATUTE AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-24-8(2) (1989): 
Privileged Communications: 
There are particular relations in which it 
is the policy of the law to encourage 
confidence and to preserve it inviolate. 
Therefore, a person cannot be examined as a 
witness in the following cases: 
* * * 
(2) An attorney cannot, without the consent 
of his client, be examined as to any 
communication made by the client to him, or 
his advice given therein, in the course of 
professional employment; nor can an 
attorney's secretary, stenographer, or clerk 
be examined, without the consent of his 
employer, concerning any fact, the knowledge 
of which has been acquired in such capacity. 
(Remainder of § 78-24-8 omitted.) 
Rule 26(b)(3), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: 
Trial Preparation: Materials. Subject to 
the provisions of Subdivision (b)(4) of this 
rule, a party may obtain discovery of 
documents and tangible things otherwise 
discoverable under Subdivision (b)(1) of 
this rule and prepared in anticipation of 
litigation or for trial by or for another 
party or by or for that other party's 
representative (including his attorney, 
consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, or 
agent) only upon a showing that the party 
seeking discovery has substantial need of 
the materials in the preparation of his case 
and that he is unable without undue hardship 
to obtain the substantial equivalent of the 
materials by other means. In ordering 
discovery of such materials when the 
required showing has been made, the court 
shall protect against disclosure of the 
mental impressions, conclusions, opinions or 
legal theories of an attorney or other 
representative of a party concerning the 
litigation. 
(Remainder of Rule 26(b)(3) omitted.) 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This appeal presents for review the district court's 
error in keeping from the plaintiff, Gold Standard, Inc. ("Gold 
Standard"), an agreement that is part and parcel of a 
-2-
commercial transaction. This case involves Gold Standard's 
rights and interests in the Mercur Mine, located in Tooele 
County, Utah. Gold Standard has sued Getty, Texaco and Barrick 
for tortious conduct, breach of contract, interference with 
property rights, and conspiracy. Gold Standard's claims 
against Texaco and Barrick involve, to a great extent, the 
transfer of the Mercur Mine from Texaco to Barrick. 
COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
The district court has denied Gold Standard's motion 
to compel American Barrick Resources Corporation ("Barrick") to 
produce an agreement dated June 11, 1985, (the "June 11 
Agreement") and signed in counterpart by the defendants. The 
June 11 Agreement is, by defendants' own admission, part and 
parcel of the arrangement for the sale of the Mercur Mine from 
Texaco to Barrick. It is, therefore, directly relevant to the 
claim that the defendants structured the sale of the Mercur 
Mine in derogation of Gold Standard's rights and interests. 
For two years after Gold Standard filed its original 
complaint, defendants represented, without qualification, that 
the complete agreement for the Mine's transfer was embodied in 
a "Stock Purchase Agreement" dated May 15, 1985. Barrick's 
privilege logs, amended at various points from March 4, 1988, 
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through February 15, 1989, never disclosed the existence of the 
June 11 Agreement. Barrick's response to interrogatories 
indicated that the Stock Purchase Agreement disclosed all 
consideration paid to Texaco and contained all terms of the 
sale. See Appendix "A," Response to Plaintiff's First Set of 
Interrogatories to the Barrick Defendants, at 26-27, 30, 
51-52. Likewise, not a single one of the key Barrick, Getty, 
or Texaco executives involved in the sale of the Mercur Mine 
ever admitted the existence of the June 11 Agreement during 
their respective depositions. 
It was not until the November 18, 1988, deposition of 
Mr. Stephen R. Dattels, one of Barrick's principal negotiators, 
that Gold Standard learned that the "Stock Purchase Agreement" 
did not in fact reflect all of the terms and conditions of the 
transfer, but that a separate agreement sent to counsel was 
also part and parcel of this transaction. After months of 
requests, Barrick's counsel finally identified this agreement 
as the June 11 Agreement. 
Gold Standard immediately moved the district court for 
an order to compel production of this agreement. In response 
to Gold Standard's motion, Barrick submitted the June 11 
Agreement to the district court for in camera review and argued 
that the terms of the June 11 Agreement, which it would not 
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describe at argument or in its moving papers, demonstrated an 
entitlement to protection under the attorney-client privilege 
and as attorney work-product. The defendants, however, have 
never disputed that the June 11 Agreement is part and parcel of 
the sales arrangement. The district court, in turn, held that 
the June 11 Agreement was "privileged." R. at 4754. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Gold Standard specifically alleges in its Third 
Amended Complaint: 
(a) That Getty, and its parent, Texaco, denied 
Gold Standard's rights, including its right of first 
refusal, by undertaking to sell the Mercur Mine 
without affording Gold Standard the opportunity to 
match the successful bid (R. at 4399); 
(b) That Texaco and Barrick structured the terms 
of the sales agreement to transfer the Mercur Mine so 
as to diminish Gold Standard's interest (R. at 4395); 
(c) That Barrick extracted minerals from the 
Mercur Mine despite notice of Gold Standard's rights 
and claims such that Barrick committed knowing 
trespass and conversion (R. at 4388); and 
(d) That Barrick and Texaco conspired, in the 
negotiations and agreement for the transfer of the 
Mercur Mine, to: 
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ic Transfer the Mercur Mine from Getty Oil 
Company so as to avoid recognizing the rights of 
Gold Standard, including its right of first 
refusal (R. at 4385); 
ii. To keep from Gold Standard its property 
interest by denying its 25% working interest and 
by miscalculating its purported 15% net profit 
interest (R, at 4385); and 
iii. To prevent Gold Standard from asserting 
its rights and to destroy Gold Standard as a 
business. R* at 4385. 
2, Barrick, in its negotiations with Texaco for the 
purchase of the Mercur Mine, sought "[c]larification of the 
Gold Standard claim." Appendix "B," letters dated April 2, 
1985, and April 19, 1985, Exhibits 1177 and 424, respectively. 
In Barrick1s final letter offering to purchase the Mercur Mine, 
however, Barrick removed any mention of a clarification of Gold 
Standard's claim. Appendix "C," letter dated April 19, 1985, 
Exhibit 425. 
3. According to Barrick*s chairman, Peter Munk, 
Texaco informed Barrick that it would rather take less money 
but was unwilling to accept any kind of ongoing liability for 
Gold Standard's claims. See Appendix MD,M Deposition Testimony 
of Peter Munk, at 384-385. 
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4. Shortly before the sale of the mine, Texaco 
represented to the State of Utah that the value of the mine 
exceeded one hundred million dollars ($100,000,000). 
Appendix "E," Application for Certificate of Authority. The 
final purchase price for the Mercur Mine, as reflected in the 
"Stock Purchase Agreement," was thirty-one million dollars 
($31,000,000) in cash and "a production payment in the amount 
of nine million dollars ($9,000,000)." The indemnification 
provision of the "Stock Purchase Agreement," moreover, does not 
cover Gold Standard's claims. Appendix "F," May 15, 1985, 
"Stock Purchase Agreement," Exhibit 426, 1f 2.3 and Schedule F. 
5. Stephen R. Dattels, one of Barrick's principal 
negotiators, testified that "Barrick asked for a warranty from 
Texaco with respect to Gold Standard and to be indemnified for 
any breach of that warranty." Appendix "G," November 18, 1988, 
Deposition of Stephen R. Dattels, at 279. In response to Gold 
Standard's further question whether the Stock Purchase 
Agreement reflected "the entire agreement between Barrick and 
Texaco with respect to the acquisition of the Mercur Mine," 
Barrick's counsel instructed the deponent not to answer because 
"there is an additional document that may come within the 
purview of that [question] that is covered by the work product 
privilege." R. at 4273-4274, 4281. 
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6. At the completion of Mr. Dattels8 deposition, 
Barrick's counsel agreed to provide Gold Standard with 
foundational information with respect to the "additional 
document." On November 23, 1988, counsel for Gold Standard 
sent a letter requesting that foundational information, but 
received no response. See Appendix "H," Transcript of July 13, 
1989, Hearing, at 7-8. 
7, On April 12, 1989, nearly 5 months after 
promising to provide this foundational information and after 
Gold Standard's counsel had made several follow-up requests, 
Barrick9s counsel finally disclosed that the "additional 
document" that Mr. Dattels identified as part and parcel of the 
entire arrangement for the transfer of the Mercur Mine, is an 
agreement dated June 11, 1985. R. at 4270-4271, 4281. 
According to Barrick's privilege log, the document is addressed 
to Parsons, Behle & Latimer at that time Barrick's counsel. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The district court erred when it extended the 
attorney-client privilege, or the work-product doctrine, to an 
agreement that the defendants admit is part and parcel of the 
business transaction transferring ownership of the Mercur Mine 
from Texaco to Barrick. First, the attorney-client privilege 
does not protect executed commercial agreements from 
discovery. Likewise, an executed commercial agreement does not 
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fall within the work-product doctrine because it is created for 
a nonlitigation purpose. Next, the defendants, who have the 
burden of proof, failed to establish privilege or work-product 
immunity. Finally, the district court's decision would permit 
all manner of agreements, whether lawful or not, to evade 
discovery by simply Mtunneling" them to counsel. Unless the 
district court is reversed, Gold Standard may be precluded from 
putting before the trier of fact the entirety of the commercial 
agreement at issue in this lawsuit. The order certainly 
precludes Gold Standard from obtaining, through discovery, a 
thorough understanding of the transaction and of the 
defendants' motivations and purposes in entering into the 
transaction. 
ARGUMENT 
This Court has, in effect, previously decided this 
question. In Jackson v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 495 P.2d 1254 
(Utah 1972), the Court rejected a claim of privilege and 
protection because the information was merely "funneled" to 
counsel. Id. at 1257. In this case, the district court has 
permitted the defendants to address a commercial agreement to 
counsel and then claim privilege for that agreement. Jackson 
requires the reversal of the district court. 
The June 11 Agreement is at the heart of Gold 
Standard's allegations that Barrick and Texaco structured the 
sale of the Mercur Mine so as to destroy Gold Standard's rights 
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and interests and to permit Barrick to acquire the mine for a 
lower price in return for accepting some risks as to Gold 
Standard's claims. The June 11 Agreement will evidence 
Barrick's intent and role in structuring the sale of the Mercur 
Mine. The agreement may also contain terms of liability, risk 
sharing, or indemnity—evidence Gold Standard cannot obtain 
from another source. Undoubtedly the June 11 Agreement lies at 
the heart of the questions of title, property rights, breach of 
fiduciary and contractual obligations, and conspiracy raised by 
Gold Standard. 
I. An Agreement That Is Part and Parcel Of 
A Commercial Transaction Cannot Fall 
Within The Purview Of The Attorney-
Client Privilege. 
The attorney-client privilege does not cover an 
executed commercial agreement. The privilege only applies to 
communications involving legal advice because the purpose 
behind the privilege is to promote those communications between 
counsel and client that enable the attorney to give more 
informed legal advice. It is to be narrowly construed and 
granted only in accordance with its fundamental purpose: 
The attorney-client privilege is intended to 
be strictly confined within the narrowest 
possible limits consistent with the logic of 
its principle, and the privilege is designed 
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to protect only such information a client 
communicates to his attorney so that the 
attorney may properly, competently and 
ethically carry out his representation. 
In Re Witness Before the Grand Jury, 631 F. Supp. 32, 32-33 
(E.D. Wis. 1985) (citing, United States v. Weoer, 709 F.2d 
1151, 1154 (7th Cir. 1983)) (emphasis added). See also 
Jackson, 495 P.2d at 1257; Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 
391, 403 (1976). The June 11 Agreement was not communicated to 
counsel in order to gain legal advice; rather, it is a business 
document, executed in counterpart by parties on both sides of 
the sale of the Mercur Mine. 
Defendants could not have a legally protectable 
expectation of confidentiality in executing an agreement that 
was part of an arms-length commercial transaction. A 
protectable expectation of confidentiality necessarily involves 
a need to divulge the communication in confidence; the mere 
hope that the terms of a transaction will remain secret is not 
enough. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 
(1981) (quoting Trammel v. .United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 
(1980) for the proposition that "the attorney-client privilege 
rests on the need for the advocate and counselor to know all 
that relates to the client's reasons for seeking 
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representation.ee) Ihe lack of a protectable expectation 
shatters the claim of privilege. Jo Gergacz, Attorney 
Corporate-Client Privilege, at 3-39 (1987). 
A commercial agreement, by definition, is a business 
document. The attorney-client privilege only protects legal 
advice. In order to fall within the privilege's protection, a 
party must establish that "the primary purpose of submitting 
the material to its attorney [is] for legal analysis and 
advice." Jackson, 495 P.2d at 1257. See also Gergacz, at 3-31 
(requiring that "the legal aspects of the communication are 
dominant") (citations omitted). Otherwise, the communication 
is discoverable: 
The attorney-client privilege protects 
confidential disclosures made by a client to 
an attorney to obtain legal advice Fisher v. 
United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 
(1976). . . . The privilege does not permit 
an attorney to conduct his client's business 
affairs in secret. 
In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 803 F.2d 493, 496 (9th Cir. 1986), 
corrected, 817 F.2d 64 (1987) (citations omitted) (emphasis 
added). See also In Re Walsh, 623 F.2d 489, 494 (2d Cir.), 
cert, denied, 449 U.S. 994 (1980) ("The [attorney-client] 
relationship itself does not create 'a cloak of protection 
which is draped around all occurrences and conversations which 
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have any bearing, direct or indirect, upon the relationship of 
the attorney with his client.'" (citing United States v. 
Goldfarb 328 F.2d 280, 281-282 (6th Cir. 1964)). An agreement 
to allocate risks or costs, to represent or warrant the merit 
of claims, or to set forth consideration for the transfer of a 
mine is a business document by its very nature. 
Similarly, the law does not protect the "external 
trappings" of the attorney-client relationship, such as the 
existence of the relationship, the fees paid, "and the basic 
terms of the attorney's employment." Gergacz, at 335 
(citations omitted). See also In Re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 803 
F.2d at 496; In re Walsh, 623 F.2d at 494; Olive v. Isherwood, 
Hunter & Diehm, 656 F. Supp. 1171, 1173 (D.V.I. 1987); Real v. 
Continental Group, Inc., 116 F.R.D. 211, 214 (N.D. Cal. 1986); 
8 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 
§ 2017; Hellerstein, "A Comprehensive Survey of the 
Attorney-Client Privilege and Work-Product Doctrine," Current 
Problems in Federal Civil Practice (1988). 
In Bailey v. Meister Brau, Inc., 55 F.R.D. 211 (N.D. 
111. 1972), the court rejected the claim of privilege for a 
retainer agreement. In Bailey, "[p]laintiff, a former chief 
operating officer and director of the Black Company, alleged 
that the defendants, Meister Brau, the Black family, and the 
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executors of the Black estate, conspired to breach his 
contractual right to purchase the company." Id,, at 212. In 
line with this theory, plaintiff claimed that the attorney, who 
was also an officer of the Black Company, may have received the 
fees from Meister Brau as "a reward for improper cooperation in 
the purchase of the Black Company." Id. at 214. To this end, 
plaintiff sought discovery of the attorney's retainer agreement 
and amount of fees. The attorney objected on the grounds that 
the information sought was protected by the attorney-client 
privilege. The Bailev court held that such agreements are 
usually not protected and ordered discovery of the document. 
Id. at 214-15. 
It is uncontroverted that the June 11 Agreement is 
part and parcel of the commercial transaction that transferred 
ownership of the Mercur Mine from Texaco to Barrick. It is a 
commercial agreement, negotiated by the parties at arms-length, 
and signed in counterpart. By its very nature, it does not 
contain the type of communication the privilege protects. For 
that reason, there is no case that allows a party to hide a 
commercial agreement that is part and parcel of a business 
transaction by way of the attorney-client privilege. 
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II. The Work-Product Doctrine Does Not 
Allow The Defendants To Shield A 
Commercial Agreement From Discovery, 
The work-product doctrine is meant to protect legal 
analyses and theories, not an executed commercial agreement 
written for the purpose of transferring ownership of a gold 
mine.l/ 
The work-product doctrine is a narrow exception to the 
otherwise "liberal scope of discovery." Trail Mountain Coal 
Co. v. Arco Coal Sales Co., 749 P.2d 637, 639 (Utah 1988). It 
allows a party to withhold "documents and tangible things . . . 
prepared in anticipation of litigation." Utah R. Civ. 
P. 26(b)(3). As in the case of the attorney-client privilege, 
application of the work-product doctrine is limited to those 
instances where its use would further its intrinsic purposes. 
Simon v. G.D. Searle & Co., 816 F.2d 397, 400 (8th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 484 U.S. 917 (1987). 
The work-product doctrine only protects that material 
which is created as preparation for trial or for use at trial: 
i/ The district court limited its decision to finding that the 
June 11 Agreement was "privileged" (R. at 4754). Both the 
trial court and the defendants have treated both the 
attorney-client privilege and the work product immunity as 
privileges. Gold Standard, therefore addresses the 
applicability of the work product doctrine to this controversy. 
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Materials assembled in the ordinary course 
of business, or pursuant to public 
requirements unrelated to litigation, or for 
other nonlitigation purposes are not under 
the qualified immunity provided by this 
subdivision. 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3) advisory committee's note (citations 
omitted) (emphasis added). See, e.g., Mercy v. County of 
Suffolk, 93 F.R.D. 520, 522 (E.D.N.Y. 1982). The doctrine is 
intended to ensure the proper functioning of the adversary 
system by creating a "zone of privacy" within which a lawyer 
may conduct the preparation for trial free from intrusion by 
opposing counsel. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510-11 
(1947); Hellerstein, at 132. 
Discovery into a commercial agreement does not affect 
an attorney's preparation for trial. While the doctrine 
protects interview notes and legal memoranda, it does not 
protect a document signed in counterpart by six parties that is 
part and parcel of a business transaction. 
III. Defendants' Naked Assertion Of 
Attorney-Client Privilege And Attorney 
Work-Product Does Not Satisfy Their 
Burden of Proof. 
The burden of proof is on the party asserting the 
existence of the attorney-client privilege or the applicability 
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of the work-product doctrine* See Jackson, 495 P*2d at 1257; 
Sobol v, E.P. Dutton, Inc., 112 F.R.D. 99, 102 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); 
City Consumer Services, Inc. v. Home, 100 F.R.D. 740, 747 (D. 
Utah 1983). Apart from making vague and unsubstantiated 
general assertions, the only particularized offer of proof that 
the defendants made below was to offer the conclusory affidavit 
of Patrick J. Garver which asserted, without more, that the 
Agreement contained "confidential communications" and "was 
prepared in anticipation of litigation." R. at 4321.^ This 
is a wholly inadequate showing. See, e.g., Jackson, 495 P.2d 
at 1255-57 (although the defendants submitted an affidavit, 
their generalization that litigation was anticipated was 
legally insufficient to satisfy their burden of proof); cf. 
United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530, 541 (5th Cir. 
1982), reh. denied, 688 F.2d 840, cert, denied, 466 U.S. 94 
(1984) (blanket assertions of attorney-client privilege are 
unacceptable as they "disable the court and the adversary party 
from testing the merits of the claim of privilege"). 
±-' Gold Standard moved to strike Mr. Garver* s Affidavit. The 
Motion to Strike was submitted for decision with the discovery 
question. The District Court did not expressly rule on that 
motion in deciding the discovery question. 
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IV« In Effect, The District Court's Decision 
Would Permit The Use Of Privilege To Cloak 
All Manner Of Damaging Material. 
The district court's decision would permit a party to 
hide potentially damaging material by simply reducing it to 
writing, stamping it "confidential," and sending it off to 
counsel. But this Court has already held that a document is 
not protected merely because it was "funneled" to an attorney. 
In Jackson, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant, 
by "negligently allowing acid or other harmful substances to 
flow in the air . . ., caused damage to the vehicles of the 
various plaintiffs." 495 P.2d at 1255. During the discovery 
phase of the case, the plaintiffs propounded interrogatories to 
the defendant that addressed "the existence and the location of 
any records concerning the amount of acid or smelting materials 
which escape during a designated period of time." id. The 
defendant refused to answer, responding "that the record of 
emissions is maintained in the legal counsel files as 
privileged information collected at the request of legal 
counsel." id. The Court rejected this claim of privilege and 
held the information was discoverable: 
The type of information which defendant has 
compiled in the records is discoverable; 
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defendant cannot foreclose the discovery 
process by the simple expedient of funneling 
the matter into its counsel's custody. 
Id. at 1257 (emphasis added). See also In Re Grand Jury 
Testimony of Attorney X, 621 F.Supp. 590, 592 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) 
(a party is not entitled to invoke the attorney-client 
privilege where counsel is no more than a "mere •conduit'") 
(citations omitted). 
In this case, the District Court's decision threatens 
to prevent Gold Standard from putting before the trier of fact 
not only the purchase agreement in its entirety but that very 
part of the purchase agreement that specifically addresses Gold 
Standard. In its first offer letters to Texaco, Barrick 
evidenced a serious concern for Gold Standard's claims, 
conditioning its bid on clarification of the claims to a 
working interest and to a first right of refusal. (See Fact 
No. 2) Texaco, in turn, represented that it would not accept 
any ongoing liability for Gold Standard's claims. (See Fact 
No. 3) Once Barrick removed all reference to Gold Standard in 
its final offer letter (See Fact No. 2), Texaco agreed to sell 
the mine, valued at over $100 million, to Barrick for $31 
million with a potential $9 million production payment. (See 
Fact No. 4) After the Stock Purchase Agreement was signed but 
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before any money changed hands, the parties executed a separate 
agreement as to Gold Standard's claims and merely funneled it 
to Barrick's counsel. Through the first two years of 
discovery, the defendants refused to disclose the very 
existence of this agreement. Even after Mr. Dattels disclosed 
its existence, the defendants would not identify the agreement 
for nearly five months. (See Fact Nos. 6-7) And now the 
district court has prevented Gold Standard from conducting 
discovery into the defendants' decision to remove from the 
offer letters any condition and to except from the indemnity of 
the Stock Purchase Agreement any warranty as to Gold Standard's 
claims. 
Gold Standard has a right to establish that the 
defendants agreed not to recognize Gold Standard's rightful 
interest in the mine but rather chose to risk litigation. 
Likewise, Gold Standard has a right to establish that part of 
the consideration for the transfer of the mine was the 
allocation of risks and costs associated with Gold Standard's 
claims. And Gold Standard has the right to establish the 
defendants' intentional wrongful conduct by presenting to the 
jury the June 11, 1585 Agreement. The Court should not 
frustrate the truth-finding process by allowing these 
defendants to hide the commercial transaction by simply 
fashioning their agreement to appear to be some privileged 
communication. 
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CONCLUSION 
Just as the Court ordered discovery in Jackson, it 
should be ordered here. There is no basis in law or fact for 
the district court to permit the defendants to use the 
attorney-client privilege or work-product doctrine to keep from 
Gold Standard and from the trier of fact terms of a commercial 
agreement that go to the heart of Gold Standard's claims. 
Accordingly, Gold Standard requests this Court to reverse the 
district court's decision. 
DATED this / / day of December, 1989. 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
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